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THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE ON ECONOMIC CAPITAL
AND RISK ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE
BY
BRUCE T. PORTEOUS AND PRADIP TAPADAR
ABSTRACT
The impact that capital structure and capital asset allocation have on finan-
cial services firm economic capital and risk adjusted performance is considered.
A stochastic modelling approach is used in conjunction with banking and
insurance examples. It is demonstrated that gearing up Tier 1 capital with
Tier 2 capital can be in the interests of bank Tier 1 capital providers, but may
not always be so for insurance Tier 1 capital providers. It is also shown that,
by allocating a bank or insurance firm’s Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to higher yield-
ing, more risky assets, risk adjusted performance can be enhanced. These results
are particularly pertinent with the advent of the new Basel 2 and Solvency 2
risk based capital initiatives, for banks and insurers respectively.
KEYWORDS
Asset allocation, capital gearing, economic capital, financial services firms risk
adjusted performance, stochastic models, Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of new risk based regulations for financial services firms,
specifically Basel 2 for banks and Solvency 2 for insurers, quantitative risk
management has taken a step change in importance for firms, capital providers
and regulators. For example, financial services firms are now expected, and
required, to self assess and quantify the amount of capital that they need to cover
the risks they are running. This self assessed quantum of capital is commonly
termed risk, or economic, capital.
In this article we will use the term economic capital throughout. We also use
the term actual capital to mean the total amount of equity and debt capital that
the firm has raised to back its business, particularly its economic capital amount.
Porteous and Tapadar (2005), in their recent book, have given a very compre-
hensive discussion of economic capital for financial services conglomerates,
and we will build on this work, and their examples, wherever possible.
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See also the articles by Porteous, McCulloch and Tapadar (2003), Por-
teous (2004) and Porteous (2005) which provide further detailed examples and
discussion of economic capital for financial services firms using the ideas pre-
sented in Porteous and Tapadar (2005). The books by Dev (2004) and Matten
(2000) also contain relevant material.
1.1. Two Fundamental Questions
Hereafter, we will assume that firms use economic capital as a key risk man-
agement tool in the running of their businesses. The article is then concerned
with two fundamentally important questions regarding how firms structure
their actual capital, and how they invest it.
The first fundamental question that we consider is as follows:
QUESTION 1: How does a firm’s economic capital amount depend on the
equity-debt capital structure of the actual capital that is backing it and
what impact does this structure have on the risk adjusted returns earned on
the firm’s equity capital?
When raising fresh capital, or when reorganising their capital structures, firms
will want to understand what impact capital structure has on capital efficiency.
For example, backing economic capital with increased amounts of debt capi-
tal, rather than equity, increases the leverage of the equity capital. But, do the
returns earned on the more highly leveraged equity capital compensate the
equity capital providers for the additional risks that they are taking on?
This difficult question is further complicated by the fact that a firm’s economic
capital amount itself depends on the equity-debt capital structure of the actual
capital backing it.
The second fundamental question that we consider is:
QUESTION 2: How does a firm’s economic capital amount depend on the
asset allocation of the actual capital that is backing it and what impact
does this asset allocation have on the risk adjusted returns earned on the
firm’s equity capital?
Firms often invest their actual capital in low risk assets, such as short term cash.
However, if a firm chooses to invest its actual capital in more risky, but higher
earning, assets such as equity assets, is this in the best interests of the firm’s
equity capital providers? Investing in equity assets is clearly more risky for the
equity capital providers, but are they adequately compensated by the higher
returns that they might expect to earn? This question is again further compli-
cated by the fact that economic capital, itself, depends on the asset allocation
of the actual capital that is backing it.
In the Sections that follow, we study and investigate these two fundamen-
tal questions via the construction of illustrative examples.
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1.2. Why is Economic Capital Important?
Firms, regulators, ratings agencies and capital providers all have a very keen
interest in economic capital, for the following main reasons.
Firms: Comparison of the firm’s actual capital to its economic capital
allows the firm to assess if it has enough actual capital to cover the risks that
it is running. If it does not, then it should consider raising more actual capi-
tal, or de-risking its balance sheet. If it holds more actual capital than economic
capital, then this may be inefficient, deflating equity capital provider returns,
and the firm may therefore wish to consider reorganising its balance sheet.
Regulators: A firm’s regulatory capital amount should, at least in theory,
represent a good approximation to its economic capital amount. Otherwise
regulators may require firms to hold more actual capital than they need,
which is inefficient, or less, which is imprudent, to cover the risks that the firm
is running. If regulatory capital does not represent a good approximation to
economic capital, regulators may wish to revisit firms’ regulatory capital
requirements and also to consider improving their regulations.
Rating agencies: In assessing the ability of a firm to service its actual capi-
tal, and the security of that capital, ratings agencies will be interested in comparing
the firm’s actual capital amount to its economic capital amount. For example,
if the firm’s actual capital is lower than its economic capital, under an optimistic
self assessment of economic capital made by the firm, then the firm is poten-
tially running too much risk for its capital base. This jeopardises the security
of that actual capital, and also the firm’s ability to service it. The rating agen-
cies will therefore count this against the firm and will consequently allocate it
a lower credit rating than they would otherwise do, if actual capital at least
matched economic capital.
Capital providers: The providers of actual capital, both equity and debt
capital, will want to know how secure their investment is and may require
an assessment of the risks they are taking on, as well as an estimate of the risk
adjusted returns that they are likely to earn. As described in Porteous and
Tapadar (2005), economic capital can help the capital providers obtain answers
to these questions, particularly by measuring risk adjusted firm performance
using the rate of return earned on the equity capital that backs the firm’s eco-
nomic capital amount.
1.3. Other Research
Firm capital structure, and the rates of return earned by different types of
capital providers, have been active areas of research for many years now. For
example, as is now very well known, Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed
that, under certain fairly restrictive assumptions, firm value is independent of
capital structure.
This seminal work has been followed up by extensive research exploring,
for example, the effect of relaxing various of the Modigliani-Miller assumptions.
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More recently, Rajan and Zingales (1995) have studied firm leverage across a
number of different economies.
However, although there are many published articles and books that discuss
the relationship between capital structure and the risk-reward relationship
for equity and debt capital providers, this work does not generally approach
the problem from the perspective of economic capital. It is this economic
capital perspective, especially in the new Basel 2-Solvency 2 world, that makes
the work presented here, we feel, of particular relevance.
The two fundamental questions considered here, which are expressed in
economic capital terms, are of great practical importance in the new Basel 2-
Solvency 2 world as firms seek to optimise their capital structuring, asset allo-
cation and management processes. We hope, therefore that, not only will the
results presented here be of some practical use to firms, but the article will
also encourage more work to be carried out in this important area.
1.4. Structure of the Article
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: in Section 2, we discuss
the different types of capital that are eligible to count towards a firm’s regu-
latory capital requirement. Section 3 defines and discusses economic capital and
Section 4 describes the detailed assumptions that underpin our illustrative
examples. The first example of a retail mortgage bank is relevant to Basel 2,
whereas the second example of a life insurance annuity firm is relevant to Sol-
vency 2. Section 5 examines how economic capital and risk adjusted perfor-
mance depend on the firm’s equity-debt capital structure and Section 6 looks
at how economic capital and risk adjusted performance depend on the asset
allocation of the actual capital that backs it. Section 7 then considers how
economic capital and risk adjusted performance depend jointly on a firm’s
equity-debt capital structure and its actual capital asset allocation. Finally,
in Section 8, we draw together the main conclusions of the article and discuss
optimal capital structuring, asset allocation and management processes for
financial services firms.
2. THE ROLE OF CAPITAL AND DIFFERENT TYPES OF CAPITAL
Actual capital, in its broadest sense, acts as a buffer to absorb losses incurred by
financial services firms in times of financial stress. It therefore provides security
and protection to customers owed money by the firm. For example, the depos-
itors of a bank, or the individual pensions savers of a life insurance firm.
Three key properties of capital are therefore:
– It should be able to absorb losses.
– It should be available permanently.
– It should be fully paid up.
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Regulators grade capital by its quality, as discussed below, with the highest
quality capital graded as Tier 1 and lower graded capital as Tier 2. Within
Tier 1 there is also a sub-grading into Core Tier 1 and the lower graded Inno-
vative Tier 1. Within Tier 2, there are sub-gradings, into Upper and Lower
Tier 2, for example.
The rules that define whether a specific type of capital issued by a firm qualifies
as Tier 1, or Tier 2, and how much of that capital instrument is eligible to be
counted towards a firm’s regulatory capital requirement, are somewhat arbi-
trary. For example, Tier 2 capital is usually eligible only up to the level of the
firm’s Tier 1 capital, with any excess amount beyond this level ineligible. Rather
than describing the precise detail of these rules in this article, which we feel will
not add much value, we prefer instead to focus on describing the key charac-
teristics of Tier 1 type and Tier 2 type actual capital.
Tier 1 type actual capital tends to comprise mainly of what we term equity
capital. In other words, share capital that is completely subordinated and perpetual
with the ability to waive dividends, if required. We regard the providers of a firm’s
equity capital as the principal risk takers in supporting the business of the firm.
Tier 2 type actual capital tends to comprise mainly of what we term debt
capital. In other words, loans which rank ahead of equity capital, and which
are usually not permanent and do not have the ability to waive interest,
although interest may be deferred.
With debt capital, if the firm is unable to pay, or defer, a scheduled inter-
est or redemption payment, then a default event occurs. Depending on the
debt capital issuance terms and conditions, the debt capital providers may have
the right to call in their loans and to require the firm to restructure its actual
capital in order to receive what is owed to them. Ultimately, the firm may have
to be liquidated, although this would be a very extreme measure, to be used
only if the firm is unable to continue trading.
Debt capital is attractive to firms as, unlike equity capital, its cost can be
met out of before tax profits. This is one reason why debt capital is cheaper
than equity capital, in addition to it also being less risky.
However, as described earlier, regulators regard debt capital less highly
than equity capital. As a consequence, debt capital tends to be less eligible to
count towards a firm’s regulatory capital requirements than equity capital.
The Holy Grail for firms, and their investment bank advisers, is hybrid capital
that counts as debt capital for interest payment purposes, but as equity capital
for regulatory capital eligibility purposes. This is an area of constant tension
and friction between firms and their advisers, on the one hand, and regulators
on the other.
In fact, the Basel Committee of the Bank for International Settlements and
the European Commission have both initiated projects investigating capital
definition and eligibility rules. This work can ultimately be expected to lead to
new capital rules and regulations.
We now move on to define and discuss economic capital. As described in
Sub-section 1.1, fundamental question 1, a key objective of this article is to
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understand what impact a firm’s Tier 1-Tier 2 capital structure has on eco-
nomic capital and risk adjusted performance.
3. ECONOMIC CAPITAL
Although economic capital is a ubiquitous term and is widely discussed within
the financial services industry, surprisingly, there is no commonly accepted
standard definition of it. In order to move forward and answer the two fun-
damental questions posed in Sub-section 1.1, we need a definition of economic
capital that we can work with. Porteous and Tapadar (2005) define economic
capital as:
DEFINITION 1: Economic capital, for the business of a firm, is the amount
of capital, or excess assets, that this business requires to ensure that its real-
istic, or market value, balance sheet remains solvent, over a specified time hori-
zon, with a prescribed probability or confidence level, following events that
are unexpected, yet not so unlikely that they might never occur in practice.
Basically, Definition 1 states that economic capital is the amount of capital that
the business of a firm needs to keep its realistic balance sheet solvent under stress
events. It is worth noting that, by design, this definition is completely indepen-
dent of the firm’s actual capital, particularly its structure and asset allocation.
In proposing this definition, Porteous and Tapadar (2005) made the follow-
ing two implicit assumptions:
Implicit assumption 1: Once economic capital is quantified, it is backed
entirely by equity capital. As the dividends paid on equity capital can be
waived at the discretion of the firm, there is therefore no need to hold any
additional capital, or excess assets, to provide for dividend payments under
stress events. However, once debt capital is introduced, this is no longer the
case. This is because the interest payments on debt capital generally
cannot be waived. Additional capital, or excess assets, must then be held
to provide for these interest payments in times of stress, to protect the
providers of the debt capital.
Implicit assumption 2: The actual capital backing a firm’s economic capi-
tal amount is invested in risk free short term cash assets and the economic
capital requirements of the risks associated with these assets are negligible.
If the firm’s actual capital is invested in more risky assets, relative to short
term cash, then the situation changes. For example, if the firm’s actual cap-
ital is invested in equity assets, there is a possibility that, under a stress
event, the actual capital may lose value and may no longer be sufficient to
ensure that the realistic balance sheet of the firm’s business remains solvent.
Additional capital, or excess assets, may then be required to provide for
these potential actual capital asset losses in times of stress. In other words,
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the firm’s actual capital itself may have an economic capital requirement
associated with the asset risks in which it is invested.
For the purposes of this article, we therefore propose the following enhanced
definition of economic capital:
DEFINITION 2: Economic capital for a firm is the total amount of capital,
or excess assets, required to ensure:
– the realistic balance sheet of the firm’s business remains solvent;
– the firm is able to meet its capital contractual obligations;
– the risks associated with the assets in which the firm’s actual capital is
invested are covered;
all following unexpected events that occur over a specified time horizon, with
a prescribed probability.
It is fairly straightforward to see that when a firm introduces debt capital to
back its economic capital, economic capital increases because additional assets
are required to provide for the interest payments on the debt capital in times
of stress. It is again straightforward to see that, as the debt capital increases,
the gearing of the equity capital increases. The gearing effect causes the equity
capital expected returns, and the volatility of those returns, to increase. However,
the associated increase in economic capital, which we assume in this article is
always provided for by equity capital, also deflates the equity capital returns.
In short, it is less than straightforward to see how the equity capital provider’s
risk adjusted returns are altered by the introduction of debt capital.
Similarly, it is straightforward to see that, as firms allocate their actual cap-
ital to riskier, and so higher earning assets, the returns expected to be earned
on the firm’s equity capital will increase, as will the volatility of those earned
returns. However, the consequent potential increase in economic capital resulting
from allocating the firm’s actual capital to more risky assets can cause these
enhanced returns to be deflated. Again, it is not clear if the providers of the
firm’s equity capital are better off by allocating the firm’s actual capital to riskier
assets.
In Sections 5, 6 and 7, we will consider specific examples which provide some
insight into these issues and questions. However, before doing this, we set out
in Section 4 the detailed assumptions that underpin our illustrative examples.
4. THE EXAMPLES AND KEY ASSUMPTIONS
The basic structures of the examples that we use in this article are taken
from Porteous and Tapadar (2005). We have built upon and enhanced these
structures further for the purposes of this article. Specifically, the examples
comprise a retail mortgage bank and a life insurance annuity firm. The former
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example is relevant to Basel 2, whereas the latter is relevant to Solvency 2.
We provide a brief outline of the examples below, but please refer to Appen-
dices 1 and 2 of this article and also Porteous and Tapadar (2005) for the full
details.
4.1. Stochastic Model
The stochastic model that we use is a fairly standard 21 dimensional multivari-
ate normal first order autoregressive time series model, where the multivariate
dependency structure of the 21 individual response variables is modelled using
a graphical model, as explained below.
The 21 individual univariate time series models, described below, model the
within-series dependency, or serial dependency, structures of each of the indi-
vidual response variables.
To model the between-series, or multivariate, dependency structure of the
21 individual response variables, we use a multivariate normal model where the
correlation structure of the 21 dimensions is modelled using a graphical model,
which describes the assumed conditional independence properties of the 21
dimensions. Graphical models are described briefly in Sub-section 4.1.1 below,
but see Lauritzen (1996) and Porteous and Tapadar (2005) for fuller descrip-
tions. They are extremely useful dimension reduction tools that can be used to
explain very high dimensional dependency relationships amongst random vari-
ables using low dimensional clusters, or cliques, of relationships.
Note that the description of the stochastic model provided in this article
completely specifies the model. This, therefore, allows the reader to reconstruct
the model, or a similar model, if required.
In the examples that we consider in this article we will, in fact, use only a
relatively small subset of the 21 response variables. In other words, we will use
only those response variables that are needed to construct the examples, as is
explained in Appendices 1 and 2.
4.1.1. Investment Response Variables
We model the i-th response variable at time t, Zit, as the sum of an uncondi-
tional expectation mi and a first order autoregressive time series with constant
volatilities and correlations, although stochastic volatilites and correlations can
also be accommodated if required. In other words, Zit = mi + Yit, where:
Yit = biYi (t –1) + eit. (1)
The error terms eit + N(0,si
2) and are assumed to be independently distributed
across time. Note that E[Zit] = mi and that the first order autoregressive
parameter bi controls the strength of the within-series dependency for the
i-th response variable. So, for example, “large” positive values of bi will mean
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that there will be very strong positive serial dependency within the i-th response
variable.
Table 1 shows the parameterisation of the 21 univariate autoregressive
time series models that make up the full 21 dimensional stochastic model.
The annual expected values, the mis, and the annual standard deviations, the
si / i sb1
2
- , of the individual response variables are also shown.
The correlation structure of the ei error terms is modelled using a graphi-
cal model, as displayed in Figure 1. In this figure, response variable error terms
that are directly connected to each other correlated, with the assumed con-
stant correlation coefficient values rij, as set out in Table 2.
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TABLE 1
STOCHASTIC MODEL: UNIVARIATE MODEL PARAMETERISATION.
First order Unconditional
Unconditional autoregressive standard deviation 
Investment Response Variable expectation parameter of error terms 




1 Retail Price Inflation (“RPI”) 0.0275 0.975 0.00750 
2 Equity earnings/dividend growth 0.0425 0.950 0.02000 
3 Equity dividend yield 0.0325 0.975 0.00750 
4 Short term cash yield 0.0475 0.975 0.00750 
5 Medium term government bond yield 0.0500 0.975 0.01875 
6 Medium term corporate bond yield 0.0550 0.975 0.01875 
7 Long term government bond yield 0.0525 0.975 0.01875 
8 Long term corporate bond yield 0.0575 0.975 0.01875 
9 Mortgage Yield 0.0575 0.975 0.00750 
10 Property rental growth 0.0325 0.950 0.01875 
11 Property rental yield 0.0425 0.975 0.00750 
12 £ appreciation against $ 0.0200 0.000 0.02500
US economic
13 Consumer Price Inflation (“CPI”) 0.0200 0.975 0.00750 
14 Equity earnings/dividend growth 0.0625 0.950 0.02000 
15 Equity dividend yield 0.0200 0.975 0.00750 
16 Short term cash yield 0.0200 0.975 0.00750 
17 Medium term government bond yield 0.0375 0.975 0.01875 
18 Medium term corporate bond yield 0.0425 0.975 0.01875 
19 Long term government bond yield 0.0450 0.975 0.01875 
20 Long term corporate bond yield 0.0500 0.975 0.01875 
21 Mortgage Yield 0.0425 0.975 0.00750























































Response variable error terms that are indirectly connected in Figure 1, via
other directly connected error terms, are still statistically dependent, and so are
correlated, but more weakly so. This is a property of graphical models. Such error
terms are, however, conditionally independent of each other, given the error
terms that connect them, again a property of graphical models. See Porteous
and Tapadar (2005) Appendix 7.1 for the full 21 X 21 error term correlation
matrix which is completely specified by the graphical model parameterisation
described here.
A full justification for the Table 1 and 2 parameterisations of the stochas-
tic model, and the error term multivariate normality assumption, is provided
in Porteous and Tapadar (2005) and the references contained therein. It is
demonstrated there, and also in Porteous (2004) and Porteous (2005), that this
stochastic model represents a very good first order approximation to the real
investment markets that it is modelling.
Two demographic/behavioural response variables, mortality improvement
and customer persistency, can also be seen in Figure 1. Whilst the rate at which
mortality improves does not directly depend on investment markets, customer
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TABLE 2
STOCHASTIC MODEL: ERROR TERM CORRELATION PARAMETERISATION.






















persistency behaviour can, in practice, depend on investment conditions, as
described below.
4.1.2. Mortality Improvement
The UK actuarial profession, amongst other professional bodies, UK govern-
ment departments and international agencies, studies mortality and regularly
publishes mortality tables, including allowances for future mortality improve-
ments. The data that are used for these actuarial studies are provided by the
UK life insurance industry. See Willets et al (2004) and Willets (2004), two recent
mortality studies prepared under the auspices of the UK actuarial profession,
and which provide good overviews of current mortality trends, for more infor-
mation.
Table 3, taken from Willets (2004), shows estimated annual mortality improve-
ment rates by age and calendar year for males in the general population of
England and Wales. The improvement rates are estimated over a five year
period centred on the calendar year shown. See Willets (2004).
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TABLE 3
AVERAGE ANNUAL MORTALITY IMPROVEMENT RATES FOR MALES
IN THE POPULATION OF ENGLAND AND WALES.
Calendar Year
Age Group
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
40-44 3.1% 2.1% 1.6% 0.1% 0.3% 0.9%
45-49 2.9% 3.5% 2.8% 3.1% 0.4% 0.2%
50-54 1.0% 3.7% 2.6% 2.3% 2.9% 1.7%
55-59 1.5% 1.8% 2.6% 3.1% 2.4% 3.5%
60-64 1.0% 2.1% 2.0% 3.6% 3.6% 3.2%
65-69 1.6% 2.2% 1.7% 2.1% 3.8% 4.5%
70-74 1.6% 1.9% 1.8% 2.0% 2.5% 4.6%
75-79 0.5% 2.1% 1.4% 2.2% 2.6% 2.8%
A cohort effect can be seen in the bold figures shown in Table 3 and note
also that, over calendar years, improvement rates have fallen at the younger ages,
but have increased at the older ages. Willets et al (2004) discuss the reasons for
this in detail.
Our approach to modelling mortality improvement risk stochastically is as
follows:
– We start with a base mortality table that represents a good estimate of current
mortality for the population under consideration.
– Expected improvement factors, along the lines set out in Table 3, are then
assumed and represent our best estimate expected mortality improvement
rate factors.
– These expected improvement factors will generally depend on the starting
ages of the lives being modelled in the projection, their sex, any cohort
effects and by duration within the projection.
– We perturb these expected improvement factors by the addition of a Nor-
mally distributed stochastic error term to represent the uncertainty that is
prevalent in estimating future mortality improvement factors.
– The stochastically generated improvement factors are then used to project
the base mortality table forward in time.
4.1.3. Customer Persistency
In the mortgage bank example that we describe next, we assume that cus-
tomers become less persistent as the mortgage standard variable rate rises and
mortgages become more expensive. This is because it then becomes more finan-
cially beneficial for customers to remortgage away from their current provider
onto a cheaper mortgage product, typically a new discounted rate mortgage
or fixed rate mortgage, provided by another bank.
On the other hand, with profits life insurance customers tend to become
more persistent as equity asset markets fall, because the investment guarantees
provided by such products are then perceived to have more value.
These two product examples illustrate how customer persistency depends,
not only investment markets, but also on the specific financial services prod-
uct being considered.
4.2. Basel 2 Retail Mortgage Bank Example
We consider a 20 year capital repayment floating rate mortgage and use the sto-
chastic model described in Section 4.1 to model the mortgage product response
variables, and associated derived variables, as described in Appendix 1.
We assume that the bank funds its mortgages using the wholesale funding
markets and that the cost of this funding equals the short term UK cash yield,
as generated by the stochastic model, plus 10 bp.
From Table 1 it can be seen, therefore, that the bank’s expected interest
rate margin equals 0.0575 – 0.0475 – 0.0010 = 0.0090. This is reasonably rep-
resentative of the UK banking industry, given the very intense competition
that is currently seen in the UK mortgage market.
The corresponding interest rate margin annual standard deviation, under
the Table 1 and Table 2 parameterisations, and which is driven mainly by the
assumed correlation between the short term UK cash yield and the UK mort-
gage yield, is 0.0067. This would not be unusual for a wholesale funded firm
but may be on the high side for a retail funded firm.
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Similarly, as is described in Appendix 1, the bank’s customers are assumed
to be less persistent than expected when the mortgage standard variable rate
that the bank charges its customers, as generated by the stochastic model, is
“high”. So, “high” mortgage payments are assumed to be a driver of low per-
sistency, with this behaviour modelled stochastically via the standard variable
rate response variable generated by the stochastic model.
Based on the stochastic elements of this example, described in Appendix 1,
the economic capital requirement that is generated by the stochastic model is
the amount of capital required by the bank to cover its aggregate:




all beyond the expected amounts loaded into the mortgage product pricing to
cover these risks.
We now describe how stochastic economic capital and the corresponding
Pillar 1 minimum regulatory capital requirement are calculated.
4.2.1. Bank Economic Capital Calculation
The process that we use to calculate the bank’s economic capital and its Pillar 1
minimum regulatory capital requirement, at any time point, is as follows:
Step 1. The stochastic model is used to generate one “future” scenario.
In otherwords, the stochastic model is run forwards in time to generate
monthly future values for all 21 response variables in the stochastic model.
The bank example depends on a subset of these 21 response variables and
it can therefore be determined, over its lifetime, using this future scenario.
For example, the bank’s cost of funding, for each month over the entire life-
time of the bank, can be calculated using the UK cash yields generated by
the stochastic model.
Step 2. Based on this simulated future, at every month t over the projected
lifetime of the bank, the future profits that the bank will earn from its
mortgage book can be calculated. This can be achieved because, once the
simulated future has been generated, all future variables on which the bank’s
profits depend are known and the bank’s profits for every future month
over its lifetime can then be calculated. We can then also calculate PVIFt
the present value, at time t, of all future profits that are expected to emerge
from the bank’s in force book of business. As PVIFt is equivalently an esti-
mate of the economic value of the bank’s in force mortgage book at time t,
it also equals the estimated market value of the bank’s mortgage book assets
less the estimated market value of the bank’s mortgage book liabilities at
time t.
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Step 3. In calculating PVIFt, we discount the future profits that emerge
from the bank’s mortgage book using the returns earned by the bank’s
actual capital assets, as generated by the stochastic model under this sim-
ulated future. In other words, we assume that profits are transferred to
actual capital, as they emerge, and are then invested in the same assets as
the bank’s actual capital is invested.
Step 4. If PVIFt is negative, the estimated market value of the bank’s mort-
gage book assets is less than the estimated market value of its mortgage
book liabilities. In other words, the estimated market value balance sheet of
the bank’s mortgage book is insolvent and capital of amount –PVIFt must
be injected to restore solvency.
Step 5. For each month t, we calculate the maximum value of all future
–PVIFs, for all s >= t, after having discounted back from s to t. In doing
this, we discount using the returns earned by the bank’s actual capital assets
as described in Step 3. This amount, which we denote Ct and which is sub-
ject to a minimum value of zero, represents the amount of capital that must
be injected at time t to ensure that the bank’s mortgage book estimated
market value balance sheet always remains solvent throughout its remain-
ing lifetime.
Step 6. The stochastic model is re-run to generate other future scenarios
and the above computations are repeated.
Step 7. Once the above exercise has been repeated a large number of times,
50,000 runs of the stochastic model in this example, the Cts are put in
increasing order over the 50,000 simulations of the stochastic model at each
duration t. The high percentiles of the Cts then determine the economic cap-
ital requirements of the bank’s mortgage book at each duration t. For exam-
ple, the 99.5th percentile represents an estimate of the amount of capital
that must be injected at time t to ensure that, with probability 0.995, under
this stochastic model, the bank’s mortgage book estimated market value bal-
ance sheet stays solvent over its remaining lifetime.
Step 8. The Basel 2 Pillar 1 minimum regulatory capital requirements are
also calculated, at each duration, for all of the 50,000 stochastic simulations.
Average capital requirements, across simulations and for each duration, are
then calculated. It is these average minimum regulatory capital require-
ments that we compare to our stochastically generated economic capital
amounts.
We use average Pillar 1 minimum regulatory capital requirements in our com-
parisons with economic capital for the following reasons:
1. Pillar 1 minimum regulatory capital requirements are calibrated by reg-
ulators to achieve low prescribed probabilities of firm insolvency under
“through the cycle”, or average, economic conditions.
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2. It is the Pillar 2 regulatory capital requirement that is designed by reg-
ulators to capture the capital requirements of less normal, or extreme,
economic conditions.
Our retail mortgage bank example results are described in Sections 5, 6 and 7
below.
4.3. Solvency 2 Life Insurance Annuity Firm Example
In this example, we have chosen to model a joint life last survivor annuity for
a male aged 65 and a female aged 65. The annuity income is assumed to be
level and is paid until both lives have died. We assume that the life insurance
annuity premium is invested in long term UK corporate bonds.
We again model the product response variables stochastically using the
model described in Section 4.1. The very detailed assumptions that underpin
this example are set out in Appendix 2.
However, to help explain how the stochastic model links to the example, we
briefly describe how credit risk is modelled. Credit risk losses are assumed to
be at “expected” levels, unless corporate bond yields, as generated by the sto-
chastic model, reach certain extreme “high” values. In this event, it is assumed
that credit risk losses increase sharply to higher levels, as default probabilities and
losses given default increase. In other words, high corporate bond yields are taken
as an indicator of a less favourable economic climate which leads to higher levels
of credit risk losses. In this sense, therefore, credit risk is modelled stochasti-
cally through the corporate bond yields generated by the stochastic model.
4.3.1. Stochastically Modelled Response Variables
Based on the stochastic elements of this example, as described in Appendix 2,
the economic capital requirement that is generated by the stochastic model is
the amount of capital required to cover aggregate:
– Market risks as a result of corporate bonds generating inadequate returns.
– Credit risks as a result of corporate bonds generating excessive credit losses.
– Expense risks as a consequence of RPI related unit costs increasing in line
with high levels of RPI.
– Longevity risks as a consequence of rapidly improving mortality experience.
all beyond the expected amounts loaded into the annuity product pricing to
cover these risks.
4.3.1. Life Insurance Annuity Firm Economic Capital Calculation
The method described in Section 4.2.1, used for our retail mortgage bank
example, is again used. Note that for the life insurance annuity firm example
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we have used 10,000 simulations, rather than the 50,000 used for our banking
example. This is because, as the annuity projections are more complex, and are
for longer terms, they take longer to calculate and our computing resources pre-
cluded the running of 50,000 simulations.
Our life insurance annuity results are described in Sections 5, 6 and 7 below.
4.4. Capital Assumptions
A key assumption that we make in our examples is that each firm’s Tier 1 cap-
ital comprises 100 per cent of equity capital and that each firm’s Tier 2 capi-
tal comprises 100 per cent of debt capital. The cost of the Tier 2 capital is
assumed to equal the UK short term cash yield, plus a margin of 0.5 per cent.
We have checked that this specific margin assumption affects our results entirely
as expected, with economic capital increasing with the size of the margin, and
with all of our conclusions reported here still applying.
We further assume that the firm’s total Tier 1 capital plus Tier 2 capital
equals the firm’s economic capital requirement at all durations. Movements in
the firm’s economic capital amount, by duration, are then matched by either
injections, or releases, of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to exactly track economic
capital movements.
In doing this, we assume that the firm is always able to raise sufficient Tier 1
and Tier 2 capital to back economic capital at all times. So, if the firm’s eco-
nomic capital increases because it is taking more risk, we assume that Tier 1
and Tier 2 capital is available to cover this increase at the same cost as described
above. Obviously, in practice, this may not always be the case, especially if the
firm is not performing well.
5. THE IMPACT OF TIER 1-TIER 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE
ON ECONOMIC CAPITAL
We now illustrate the impact that the Tier 1-Tier 2 capital structure of a firm
has on its economic capital amount and the corresponding returns earned by
the Tier 1 capital providers for different Tier 1-Tier 2 capital structures.
We call the firm’s economic capital amount, when it is backed 100 per cent
by Tier 1 capital, the base economic capital amount. We then consider the impact
of backing this base economic capital amount with 25 per cent, 50 per cent,
75 per cent and 100 per cent Tier 2 capital. It is assumed that any consequential
increase in economic capital, from the base economic capital amount, arising
from the Tier 2 capital backing, is backed 100 per cent by Tier 1 capital.
Economic capital increases when Tier 2 capital is introduced, firstly, because
firm profits are reduced by Tier 2 capital costs, which are charged for explicitly.
Secondly, the Tier 2 capital costs, which are themselves generated stochastically,
introduce further volatility into firm profits. These reduced, and more volatile,
profits are then spread across lower amounts of Tier 1 capital, provided that
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the associated economic capital increase, beyond the base economic capital
amount, is not too large. Given all of these moving parts, it is far from obvious,
therefore, to see what impact the gearing up of Tier 1 capital has on the risk
adjusted returns earned by the Tier 1 capital providers.
Unless stated otherwise, we assume that the actual capital backing eco-
nomic capital, and Pillar 1 minimum regulatory capital, is allocated to cash.
Our results are presented in the form of a series of figures and tables, as
described below.
5.1. Bank Capital Structure Example
The first graph shown in Figure 2 displays 99.5th percentile economic capital
for the range of Tier 2 capital backings considered. Pillar 1 minimum regulatory
capital is also shown for comparison.
As expected, it can be seen that 99.5th percentile economic capital increases
as the amount of Tier 2 capital backing of economic capital increases, although
the increases are relatively modest. It can also be seen, as noted previously by
Porteous and Tapadar (2005), that Pillar 1 capital is not a good approxima-
tion to economic capital.
The second graph in Figure 2 shows corresponding probability density
function estimates for earned rates of return on Tier 1 capital (“ROEC”), and
also on Pillar 1 capital, as generated by the simulations used to develop this
example. The probability density function estimates were obtained using stan-
dard statistical kernel density estimation techniques.
In Table 4 we show various ROEC summary statistics, again based on the
simulations used to construct the example, and including what we call the
“Sharpe ratio”, defined as mean return divided by standard deviation return.
This ratio is a potential measure of risk adjusted performance and, in statis-
tical terminology, is equivalent to the inverse of a coefficient of variation, or
a random variable standardised to have a standard deviation of one.
Inspection of the probability density functions shown in Figure 2 shows that
“gearing up” Tier 1 capital, by backing increasing proportions of economic cap-
ital with Tier 2 capital, moves the densities to the right and also increases their
skewness. In other words, ROECs generally increase, with the upside potential
of “high” ROECs also increasing, but with very little, or no, downside risk of
“low” ROECs. This behaviour can also be seen in the summary statistics shown
in Table 4. We have strong evidence, therefore, to conclude that, for this exam-
ple, gearing up Tier 1 capital is advantageous for the Tier 1 capital providers.
It is also interesting to note from Table 4 that the opposite conclusion is
reached if the Sharpe ratio is used to assess performance. In other words, a Tier
1 capital provider who measures risk using volatility, or standard deviation, may
conclude that gearing up Tier 1 capital reduces risk adjusted performance.
This conclusion is clearly invalid and consideration of the full shape of the
probability density functions shown in Figure 2 is necessary before the Tier 1
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FIGURE 2: Bank: 99.5th Percentile Economic Capital and ROEC Probability Density Functions
for Different Tier1-Tier2 Capital Structures.
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capital providers can make well informed decisions on optimal Tier 1-Tier 2
capital structuring.
5.2. Life Insurance Annuity Firm Capital Structure Example
We now move on to consider the capital structure results for the life insurance
annuity firm example.
The first graph in Figure 3 shows 99.5th percentile economic capital for the
range of Tier 2 capital backings of economic capital considered, with Pillar 1
minimum regulatory capital also shown for comparison. Again, as expected,
economic capital increases as the amount of Tier 2 capital backing of economic
capital increases, with Pillar 1 capital again being a poor proxy for economic
capital, as has been noted previously by Porteous and Tapadar (2005).
In the second graph in Figure 3 we show the corresponding ROEC prob-
ability density function estimates, with associated summary statistics shown
in Table 5. From this graph and table it can be seen that, as Tier 1 capital is
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TABLE 4
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR 99.5TH PERCENTILE ROEC FOR A BANK WITH DIFFERENT TIER1-TIER2
CAPITAL STRUCTURES (m = MEAN, s = STANDARD DEVIATION, Q1 = FIRST QUARTILE,
Q2 = SECOND QUARTILE (MEDIAN), Q3 = THIRD QUARTILE).
m s Sharpe Ratio Q1 Q2 Q3
Pillar 1 0.344 0.239 1.439 0.172 0.323 0.490 
0% Tier 2 0.195 0.134 1.454 0.099 0.186 0.280 
25% Tier 2 0.217 0.153 1.416 0.108 0.206 0.314 
50% Tier 2 0.247 0.179 1.384 0.120 0.233 0.359 
75% Tier 2 0.290 0.212 1.370 0.138 0.271 0.420 
100% Tier 2 0.353 0.259 1.366 0.165 0.325 0.509
TABLE 5
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR 99.5TH PERCENTILE ROEC FOR A LIFE INSURANCE ANNUITY FIRM WITH
DIFFERENT TIER1-TIER2 CAPITAL STRUCTURES (m = MEAN, s = STANDARD DEVIATION,
Q1 = FIRST QUARTILE, Q2 = SECOND QUARTILE (MEDIAN), Q3 = THIRD QUARTILE).
m s Sharpe Ratio Q1 Q2 Q3
Pillar 1 0.041 0.014 2.922 0.033 0.041 0.049 
0% Tier 2 0.039 0.009 4.329 0.034 0.040 0.045 
25% Tier 2 0.040 0.011 3.593 0.033 0.040 0.047 
50% Tier 2 0.040 0.014 2.830 0.032 0.041 0.049 
75% Tier 2 0.041 0.020 2.043 0.029 0.042 0.054 
100% Tier 2 0.043 0.036 1.174 0.023 0.045 0.065
FIGURE 3: Annuity: 99.5th Percentile Economic Capital and ROEC Probability Density Functions
for Different Tier1-Tier2 Capital Structures.
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geared up with Tier 2 capital, the location of the ROEC density functions
remains essentially unaltered and symmetric. The densities become steadily
more diverse, however, as Tier 1 capital is progressively geared up.
Unlike the banking example, therefore, the Tier 1 capital providers of this
life insurance annuity firm have little to gain by gearing up their Tier 1 cap-
ital. In fact, all that they achieve by doing this is to increase the riskiness of
their returns. Note that, because the ROEC densities have similar locations
and are all symmetric in this example, a Sharpe ratio analysis gives the same
conclusion.
5.3. Capital Structure General Conclusions
Based on the two examples presented in this Section, the broad conclusions that
we can arrive at are as follows:
1. In the retail mortgage bank example, gearing up Tier 1 capital with Tier 2
capital is beneficial to the providers of the Tier 1 capital. This is because
the ROEC probability density function shifts to the right, and become more
positively skewed as gearing increases. Both of these effects mean that the
Tier 1 capital providers are more likely to earn “high” returns when gearing
is itself “high”.
2. In the life insurance annuity firm example, on the contrary, gearing up Tier
1 capital with Tier 2 capital is not in the best interests of the Tier 1 capital
providers. This is because the ROEC probability density function’s location
is broadly unaltered as gearing increases, but its spread becomes wider, whilst
remaining broadly symmetric. In other words, the returns that the Tier 1 cap-
ital providers can expect to earn remain broadly unaltered, but the volatility
of these returns increases, as gearing itself increases. So the Tier 1 capital
providers have little to gain from gearing up their Tier 1 capital with Tier 2
capital.
3. In order to reach an informed decision on optimal Tier 1-Tier 2 capital struc-
ture, the Tier 1 capital providers must consider the full shape of the ROEC
probability density functions, rather than just one summary statistic which
has the potential to mislead.
In order to understand the different behaviour of these two examples we need
to consider the different asset-liability structures of the retail mortgage bank
and the life insurance annuity firm.
For the retail mortgage bank, both the asset and liability side of the mort-
gage book balance sheet have relatively “short” durations, with the asset side,
the mortgages, being longer than the liability side, wholesale funding which
reprices monthly. For the life insurance annuity firm example, both the asset
and liability side of the insurance fund balance sheet have “long” durations,
with the liability side longer initially and the asset side longer later on in the
firm projection, as the annuitants age and the annuity liability shortens.
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It is this relative long duration of the life insurance annuity firm, as com-
pared to the retail mortgage bank, that explains the different behaviour of the
bank and life insurance examples. When Tier 2 capital is introduced to gear
up Tier 1 capital, the consequent economic capital increase, over and above the
base economic capital amount, is larger for long duration firms than for short
duration firms.
In fact, the longer the outstanding duration of the firm projection, the
more additional economic capital is required to protect the Tier 2 capital
providers. This is because, the longer duration projections always contain at least
the shorter duration projection extreme scenarios. As well as geared economic
capital increases being larger absolutely for longer duration projections, our
examples also indicate that the increases are larger relatively.
So, in the life insurance annuity firm example, when Tier 2 capital is intro-
duced, economic capital increases by large amounts, relative to the retail mort-
gage bank example. This acts as a drag on the life insurance annuity firm
ROEC probability density function and prevents it from shifting location to
the right as gearing increases.
In other words, the geared economic capital increase nullifies the anticipated
higher and more volatile returns earned on the geared Tier 1 capital. For the retail
mortgage bank example, the corresponding economic capital increases are not
large enough to achieve this and the higher geared Tier 1 capital returns dominate.
It is this difference in the asset-liability structures of the two firms that
explains the differing results of the examples.
6. THE IMPACT OF ACTUAL CAPITAL ASSET ALLOCATION
ON ECONOMIC CAPITAL
In this Section, using the examples described in Sub-sections 4.2 and 4.3, we
now consider the impact that actual capital asset allocation has on a firm’s
economic capital amount and the corresponding risk adjusted returns earned
on the firm’s Tier 1 capital. Throughout the Section, we assume that economic
capital is backed entirely by Tier 1 capital and that the actual capital backing
Pillar 1 minimum regulatory capital is allocated to cash.
The four different types of UK assets that we assume the firm’s actual cap-
ital is allocated to are as follows:
– Short term cash.
– Long term government bonds.
– Long term corporate bonds.
– Equities.
These asset categories are modelled stochastically, as described in Sub-sec-
tion 4.1.1.
Allocating actual capital to more risky, but higher earning assets, relative
to cash, causes firm profits to increase, on average, but to be more volatile.
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Economic capital therefore decreases if the higher profit effect dominates the
higher volatility effect, and vice versa. These higher and more volatile profits
are therefore spread across either higher, or lower, amounts of Tier 1 capital,
depending on whether the associated economic capital amounts increase, or
decrease. Given all of these moving parts, it is far from obvious, therefore, to
see if allocating actual capital to more risky, but higher earning, assets increases
the risk adjusted returns earned by the Tier 1 capital providers.
As with the Tier 1-Tier 2 capital structuring examples discussed above, our
results are again presented in the form of figures and tables.
6.1. Bank Actual Capital Asset Allocation Example
The first graph shown in Figure 4 displays 99.5th percentile economic capital
for the range of actual capital asset allocations considered. Pillar 1 minimum
regulatory capital is also shown for comparison.
It can be seen that economic capital does not vary too much by actual cap-
ital asset allocation, with the economic capital curves being very tightly bunched
together. Differences between the curves are, however, statistically significant.
Generally speaking, assets with “high” expected returns will reduce economic
capital, whereas assets with “high” volatility will tend to increase economic
capital. The relative sizes of these expected returns and volatilities clearly also
have an impact.
The graph shows that, at short durations, economic capital is lowest when
actual capital is allocated to cash, mainly due to its low volatility, and greatest
for government bond allocation, mainly due to its low expected returns, rela-
tive to its higher volatility.
The second graph in Figure 4 shows the corresponding ROEC probability
density function estimates, including that for Pillar 1 capital, estimated from
the simulations used to develop the example.
In Table 6, we show various ROEC summary statistics, based on the simu-
lations used to construct the example, and once more, including the Sharpe ratio.
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TABLE 6
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR 99.5TH PERCENTILE ROEC FOR A BANK WITH DIFFERENT ACTUAL CAPITAL
ASSET ALLOCATIONS (m = MEAN, s = STANDARD DEVIATION, Q1 = FIRST QUARTILE,
Q2 = SECOND QUARTILE (MEDIAN), Q3 = THIRD QUARTILE).
m s Sharpe Ratio Q1 Q2 Q3
Pillar 1 0.344 0.238 1.443 0.173 0.323 0.493 
Cash 0.198 0.136 1.450 0.101 0.188 0.285 
Govt Bond 0.197 0.134 1.473 0.102 0.187 0.282 
Corp Bond 0.203 0.137 1.488 0.106 0.193 0.289 
Equity 0.220 0.141 1.555 0.119 0.208 0.308
FIGURE 4: Bank: 99.5th Percentile Economic Capital and ROEC Probability Density Functions when
Actual Capital is Allocated to Different Asset Categories.
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Inspection of the probability density functions shown in Figure 4 shows that,
apart from equity asset allocation, the density functions are all very similar and
very slightly positively skewed. In other words, allocating actual capital to cash,
government bonds or corporate bonds does not have too much of an impact
on ROEC. This behaviour can also be seen in the summary statistics shown in
Table 6.
The only density function that stands out slightly is the one where actual
capital is allocated to equity assets. This density is located further to the right
and is more positively skewed than the other density functions. In other words,
equity asset allocation increases expected returns and also the potential of posi-
tive upside on those returns. This behaviour can again be seen in the summary
statistics shown in Table 6.
We have evidence, therefore, to conclude that, for this example, allocating
actual capital to equity assets is advantageous for the Tier 1 capital providers.
It is also interesting to note from Table 6 that the same conclusion is reached
if the Sharpe ratio is used to assess performance. The Sharpe ratio is again more
reliable in this instance because the ROEC probability density functions have
similar locations and are all reasonably symmetric.
6.2. Life Insurance Annuity Firm Actual Capital Asset Allocation Example
We now move on to consider actual capital asset allocation results for the life
insurance annuity example.
The first graph in Figure 5 shows 99.5th percentile economic capital for
the range of actual capital asset allocations considered in this article, with Pil-
lar 1 minimum regulatory capital also shown for comparison.
It can be seen that economic capital is lowest for cash asset allocation, fol-
lowed by equity assets, then government bonds and finally corporate bonds.
As described earlier, the ordering of these curves is driven, in the main, by the
respective expected returns and volatilities of these asset categories.
It is interesting to note, however, that corporate bond asset allocation gives
higher economic capital than government bonds. Given the construction of
the example, this result is slightly counter intuitive as these two asset categories
are modelled as having the same volatility, but with corporate bonds having
higher expected returns. In fact, because the business assets of the annuity firm
are invested in corporate bonds, there is a slight diversification benefit when
allocating actual capital to government bonds, as compared to corporate bonds,
and it is this effect that causes economic capital to fall. Diversification benefits
between business and capital assets will be explored in more detail is a subse-
quent article.
In the second graph in Figure 5, we show the corresponding ROEC prob-
ability density function estimates, with associated summary statistics shown in
Table 7. From this graph and table it can be seen that the distribution of the
ROECs are reasonably symmetric and shift to the right as actual capital is
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FIGURE 5: Annuity: 99.5th Percentile Economic Capital and ROEC Probability Density Functions
when Actual Capital is Allocated to Different Asset Categories.
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progressively allocated to cash, then government bonds, corporate bonds and,
finally, equity assets. Moreover, as with the banking example, the equity asset
allocation shift is the largest.
Similar to the banking example, therefore, it can be seen that the Tier 1 cap-
ital providers have a real incentive for firms to allocate their actual capital to
more risky assets than cash.
The Sharpe ratio analysis indicates that allocating actual capital to corporate
bonds may be optimal for Tier 1 capital providers who assess risk using volatility,
or standard deviation. This conclusion is probably broadly appropriate for these
types of Tier 1 capital providers and the Sharpe ratio analysis works reasonably
well in this example because the ROEC density functions are symmetric.
Nevertheless, the Sharpe ratio still misses the genuine upside potential of
allocating actual capital to equity assets, which is apparent from the full ROEC
probability density functions. For this reason, we feel that consideration of the
full ROEC density functions, rather than one simple summary statistic, will
always result in better asset allocation decisions.
6.3. Actual Capital Asset Allocation General Conclusions
Based on the two examples presented in this Section, the broad conclusions that
we can arrive at are as follows:
1. The actual capital asset allocation decision does not have a material impact
on the size of the retail mortage bank’s economic capital requirements.
As discussed earlier, the reason for this is the relative shortness of the
mortgage book’s balance sheet. As a consequence, the projections are too
short for the actual capital asset allocation decision to fundamentally alter
the extreme scenarios that drive the bank’s economic capital amounts.
2. The actual capital asset allocation decision does have a material impact on
the size of the life insurance annuity firm’s economic capital requirements,
with the corporate bond economic capital curve being particularly high.
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TABLE 7
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR 99.5TH PERCENTILE ROEC FOR A LIFE INSURANCE ANNUITY FIRM WITH
DIFFERENT ACTUAL CAPITAL ASSET ALLOCATIONS (m = MEAN, s = STANDARD DEVIATION,
Q1 = FIRST QUARTILE, Q2 = SECOND QUARTILE (MEDIAN), Q3 = THIRD QUARTILE).
m s Sharpe Ratio Q1 Q2 Q3
Pillar 1 0.041 0.014 2.886 0.033 0.041 0.049
Cash 0.039 0.009 4.288 0.033 0.039 0.045
Govt Bond 0.047 0.009 4.912 0.041 0.047 0.053
Corp Bond 0.049 0.010 5.021 0.043 0.049 0.055
Equity 0.077 0.020 3.814 0.068 0.076 0.085
Again, the main reason for the difference between the bank and the life
insurance annuity firm is that the insurance fund’s balance sheet is much
longer and this gives the actual capital assets sufficient time to influence
the extreme scenarios that drive the life insurance annuity firm’s economic
capital requirements.
3. In terms of the Tier 1 capital providers ROECs, for both the retail mort-
gage bank and the life insurance annuity firm, the Tier 1 capital providers
are better off if firms allocate their capital to riskier, but higher earning, assets.
The higher returns on the more risky assets dominate the corresponding eco-
nomic capital increases. This is clearly an important conclusion as many
firms do, in fact, allocate capital to risky assets and our examples provide
a rigorous rationale to justify this.
4. In order to reach an informed decision on optimal asset allocation, the
Tier 1 capital providers need to consider the full shape of the ROEC prob-
ability density function, rather than just one summary statistic, which has
the potential to mislead.
7. THE JOINT IMPACT OF TIER 1-TIER 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND ACTUAL
CAPITAL ASSET ALLOCATION ON ECONOMIC CAPITAL
We have also carried out work, on both the banking and life insurance annuity
firm examples, where the Tier 1-Tier 2 capital structure of the firm is varied,
whilst firm actual capital is allocated 100 per cent to equity assets.
Our results are again presented in the form of a series of figures and tables,
as described below and we assume that the capital backing Pillar 1 minimum
regulatory capital, is also allocated to equity assets.
7.1. Bank Joint Capital Structure and Actual Capital Asset Allocation Example
The first graph shown in Figure 6 displays 99.5th percentile economic capital
for the range of Tier 2 capital backings considered. Pillar 1 minimum regulatory
capital is also shown for comparison.
The second graph in Figure 6 shows corresponding probability density
function estimates for earned rates of return on Tier 1 capital, as generated by
the simulations used to develop this example and Table 8 gives corresponding
ROEC summary statistics,
Comparing Figure 6 to Figure 2, and Table 8 to Table 4, shows that the
geared economic capital curves are hardly altered by allocating actual capital
to equity assets, rather than cash. Again, the shortness of the bank projection
does not allow the more volatile equity assets sufficient time to materially affect
the bank’s projected extreme scenarios that drive economic capital.
It can also be seen that the equity asset capital allocation ROEC probabil-
ity density functions are shifted to the right and are more positively skewed than
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FIGURE 6: Bank: 99.5th Percentile Economic Capital and ROEC Probability Density Functions for
Different Tier1-Tier2 Capital Structures when Actual Capital is Allocated to Equities.
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their cash equivalents. This is due to the higher and more volatile returns that
equity assets generate relative to cash.
So, we can conclude that, for each level of gearing considered, allocating
actual capital to equity assets, rather than cash, is beneficial to the Tier 1 cap-
ital providers. It is also still the case that, when allocating actual capital to
equity assets, gearing up Tier 1 capital with Tier 2 capital is beneficial to the
Tier 1 capital providers.
The Sharpe ratio is again seen to be unhelpful.
7.2. Life Insurance Annuity Firm Joint Capital Structure and Actual Capital
Asset Allocation Example
The first graph in Figure 7 shows 99.5th percentile economic capital for the
range of Tier 2 capital backings of economic capital considered with Pillar 1
minimum regulatory capital also shown for comparison.
In the second graph in Figure 7 we show the corresponding ROEC probability
density function estimates, with associated summary statistics shown in Table 9.
Comparing Figure 7 to Figure 3, and Table 9 to Table 5, shows that the eco-
nomic capital curves are significantly higher when actual capital is allocated
to equities, as compared to cash. Compared to the banking example above, it
is the longer duration of the life insurance annuity firm that allows the more
volatile equity assets to have an impact on the extreme scenarios that drive
economic capital.
It can also be seen that, when allocating actual capital to equity assets,
gearing causes the ROEC probability density functions to shift to the right
and to become more positively skewed. In other words, capital gearing, in con-
junction with allocating actual capital to equity assets, is advantageous to the
Tier 1 capital providers as they are then more likely to earn higher returns on
their capital. The Sharpe ratio again leads to the opposite conclusion, due to
asymmetries in the density functions.
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TABLE 8
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR 99.5TH PERCENTILE ROEC FOR A BANK WITH DIFFERENT TIER1-TIER2 CAPITAL
STRUCTURES WHEN ACTUAL CAPITAL IS ALLOCATED TO EQUITY ASSETS (m = MEAN, s = STANDARD
DEVIATION, Q1 = FIRST QUARTILE, Q2 = SECOND QUARTILE (MEDIAN), Q3 = THIRD QUARTILE).
m s Sharpe Ratio Q1 Q2 Q3
Pillar 1 0.355 0.244 1.452 0.181 0.333 0.504 
0% Tier 2 0.222 0.143 1.549 0.121 0.211 0.310 
25% Tier 2 0.250 0.166 1.511 0.133 0.236 0.350 
50% Tier 2 0.287 0.195 1.471 0.149 0.268 0.404 
75% Tier 2 0.339 0.236 1.438 0.172 0.312 0.477 
100% Tier 2 0.417 0.300 1.393 0.205 0.376 0.582
FIGURE 7: Annuity: 99.5th Percentile Economic Capital and ROEC Probability Density Functions for
Different Tier1-Tier2 Capital Structures when Actual Capital is Allocated to Equity Assets.
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This is contrary to the results shown in Section 5 where capital gearing,
in conjunction with allocating actual capital to cash, was seen to be against the
interests of the Tier 1 capital providers. There is, therefore, a strong inter-
action effect between capital structure and actual capital asset allocation for
the life insurance firm example, which is explained as follows.
As has been described previously, the relatively long duration of the life
insurance annuity firm causes economic capital to increase materially with
gearing. When actual capital is allocated to cash, this effect nullifies the higher
and more volatile geared Tier 1 capital returns that might be anticipated.
However, when actual capital is allocated to equity assets, the higher returns
that are earned on the equity assets are more than sufficient to dominate the
consequent economic capital increases that arise, both from gearing, and from
allocating actual capital to equity assets.
In this sense, gearing up capital is only beneficial if it is carried out in
conjunction with an actual capital higher risk asset allocation strategy. It is
interesting to note that, in practice, many firms may not be prepared to go as
far as this.
Finally in this Section, for completeness, we can also see that, for each level
of gearing assumed, allocating actual capital to equity assets is beneficial for
the Tier 1 capital providers.
7.3. Joint Capital Structure and Actual Capital Asset Allocation General Con-
clusions
Based on the two examples presented in this Section, the broad conclusions that
we can arrive at are as follows:
1. For the retail mortgage bank, capital gearing is even more beneficial to the
Tier 1 capital providers when actual capital is allocated to equity assets,
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TABLE 9
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR 99.5TH PERCENTILE ROEC FOR A LIFE INSURANCE ANNUITY FIRM WITH
DIFFERENT TIER1-TIER2 CAPITAL STRUCTURES WHEN ACTUAL CAPITAL IS ALLOCATED TO EQUITY ASSETS
(m = MEAN, s = STANDARD DEVIATION, Q1 = FIRST QUARTILE, Q2 = SECOND QUARTILE (MEDIAN),
Q3 = THIRD QUARTILE).
m s Sharpe Ratio Q1 Q2 Q3
Pillar 1 0.084 0.042 2.018 0.063 0.079 0.098 
0% Tier 2 0.078 0.029 2.700 0.068 0.076 0.085 
25% Tier 2 0.092 0.035 2.627 0.078 0.089 0.101 
50% Tier 2 0.114 0.049 2.322 0.092 0.108 0.128 
75% Tier 2 0.160 0.111 1.436 0.116 0.141 0.176 
100% Tier 2 0.300 0.567 0.530 0.157 0.203 0.282
than when it is allocated to cash. For each level of gearing assumed, allo-
cating actual capital to equity assets, rather than to cash, is beneficial.
2. For the life insurance annuity firm, gearing becomes beneficial, rather than
detrimental, to the Tier 1 capital providers when actual capital is allocated
to equity assets, rather than to cash. For each level of gearing assumed,
allocating actual capital to equity assets, rather than to cash, is beneficial.
3. The different behaviour of the retail mortgage bank and the life insurance
annuity firm is explained by the different asset-liability structures of their
balance sheets and, in particular, their differing lengths.
8. CONCLUSIONS
Important current trends in financial services markets affecting the structure,
asset allocation and management of capital for financial services firms are as
follows:
1. Financial services markets are globalising and are becoming ever more com-
petitive and commoditised.
2. Capital providers are becoming more sophisticated in their assessment of
risk and in their ability to quantify risk adjusted performance.
3. Regulatory and economic capital requirements are converging.
As these trends strengthen, and gather pace, it is essential that financial ser-
vices firms and conglomerates manage their capital as efficiently as possible in
order to stay competitive. For otherwise, firms will risk delivering inferior risk
adjusted returns to their equity capital providers, so resulting in poor share price
performance. This, in turn, will make the raising of fresh capital, to further sup-
port and develop their businesses, more difficult.
Perhaps most importantly, however, ineffective capital management is bad not
just for the financial services industry itself, but also for the wider economy more
generally. If capital providers are not earning full and fair risk adjusted returns,
this can result in capital market inefficiencies, distortions and misallocations.
In this article, for specific financial services firm examples, we have shown
how firm economic capital and risk adjusted performance depend on both
Tier 1-Tier 2 capital structure and actual capital asset allocation. For the exam-
ples considered here, we have found that:
– Gearing up Tier 1 capital with Tier 2 capital, and allocating actual capital
to high earning risky assets, generally increases economic capital, with the
increases being higher for the life insurance annuity firm. The asset-liability
structures of the two firms and, in particular, their relative lengths explains
this difference. Generally speaking, longer duration balance sheets are more
sensitive to gearing and to allocating actual capital to risky assets.
– For the retail mortgage bank, gearing up Tier 1 capital with Tier 2 capital,
and allocating actual capital to higher earning but more risky assets, which
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both increase economic capital, are individually, and jointly, beneficial to
Tier 1 capital providers. Most benefit is achieved when capital is both highly
geared and allocated to risky assets.
– For the life insurance annuity firm, gearing up Tier 1 capital with Tier 2
capital is beneficial to the Tier 1 capital providers only when actual capital
is allocated to risky, but higher earning assets. When actual capital is allo-
cated to lower earning, but safer assets, gearing is detrimental to the Tier 1
capital providers. Again, most benefit is achieved when capital is both highly
geared and allocated to risky assets. The asset-liability structures of the two
firms considered and, in particular, their respective lengths again explain the
bank-insurer differences.
– In order to reach an informed decision on the optimal Tier 1-Tier 2 capital
structure and actual capital asset allocation, the Tier 1 capital providers
need to consider the full shape of the ROEC probability density functions,
rather than just one summary statistic, which has the potential to mislead.
In practice, we recommend that each firm must analyse its own businesses, and
circumstances, before it can draw any clear conclusions on the optimality, or
otherwise, of its own capital structuring, asset allocation and management
processes. Key to this analysis will be the development and implementation of
robust and accurate risk management tools that allow firms to self assess and
quantify the risks that they are running across all of their businesses.
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Risk discount rate used in The return earned on the assets that firm actual capi-
economic capital calculation tal is allocated to, as generated by the stochastic model,
parameterised according to Table 1.
Corporate tax rate 30%.
Mortgage product economic capital assumptions
Average loan size £100,000.
Loan to value percentage 100%.
Average term 20 years.
Interest only/capital repay- Only a capital repayment mortgage is used in the exam-
ment mix ples.
Standard variable rate As generated by the stochastic model.
1 year discount 1.0% deduction from standard variable rate.
Redemption penalty 2.5% of the loan outstanding at that duration within
the first 12 months. No penalty is levied beyond the
first 12 months.
Flexible features No.
Cost of funding The short term UK cash yield as generated by the sto-
chastic model plus 0.1%.
Expected credit risk losses Loss given repossession (“LGR”) is calculated as:
LGR = (loan outstanding) – (property value) ≈ 0.95,
if positive, and zero otherwise.
Selling costs and late interest are assumed to amount
to 5% of the value of the property on repossession.
The property value is estimated as its starting value
increased in line with UK HPI, as generated by the
stochastic model.
Expected and high probabilities of repossession (“PR”)
are assumed as follows:
Expected PR = 0.0025 p.a.
High PR = 0.005 p.a.
High PRs are used if the standard variable rate, as
generated by the stochastic model, exceeds its uncon-
ditional expected value plus twice its unconditional
standard deviation, as shown in Table 1, or if LGR >
1% of the property value at that duration.
In other words, High PRs are used if either mortgage
rates are high, or if a loss of at least 1% of the prop-
erty value would be made on repossessing and selling
the property.
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For defaults, it is assumed that 1 in 5 defaults lead to
a repossession and loss given defaults are, on average,
1/5th of loss given repossessions. These default proba-
bilities and losses are then used to compute the Basel 2
Pillar 1 credit risk capital requirement.
Fixed expenses £300 (acquisition), £50 p.a. (maintenance), £100 (clo-
sure).
Fixed expense inflation UK RPI as generated by the stochastic model.
Variable initial expense 0.5% of initial loan.
Annual prepayment rates Two prepayment rate series are used:
Expected: 1%, 25%, 15%, 12.5% and 10% p.a. of the
loan outstanding at durations 1, 2, 3, 4, and $ 5 years 
High: 1%, 50%, 20%, 15% and 10% p.a. of the loan
outstanding at durations 1, 2, 3, 4, and $ 5 years.
Expected lapse rates are used unless the standard vari-
able rate, as generated by the stochastic model, is larger
than its unconditional expected value plus twice its
unconditional standard deviation as shown in Table 1.
In other words, high standard variable rates are a cause
of high prepayment rates.
Basel 2 Pillar 1 minimum Advanced internal ratings based approach for the retail
regulatory capital requirement credit risk capital requirement, where the probabilities
of default and loss given defaults, as described above,
are used. The operational risk capital requirement is
calculated using the standardised approach and is
based on the net interest income earned on the loan at
each duration, gross of expenses.
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APPENDIX 2
LIFE INSURANCE ANNUITY EXAMPLE
Economic assumptions
Risk discount rate used in The return earned on the assets that firm actual capi-
economic capital calculation tal is allocated to, as generated by the stochastic model,
parameterised according to Table 1.
Asset allocation of non 100% in long term UK corporate bonds.
profit long term business
fund (“NPLTBF”)
Long term UK corporate The long term UK corporate bond yield, as generated
bond gross yield by the stochastic model, parameterised according to
Table 1.
Long term UK government The long term UK government bond yield, as gener-
bond yield ated by the stochastic model, parameterised according
to Table 1.
Term of long term UK 15 years. At the end of each month, assets are sold and
corporate bond assets reinvested in corporate bonds of duration 15 years, at
backing the annuity the yield prevailing at the end of the month.
Corporate tax rate 30%.
Annuity product economic capital assumptions
Average single premium size £250,000.
Annuity income Level £1,500 per month.
Mix of business Joint life last survivor annuity for a male aged 65 and
female aged 65.
Mortality Base mortality tables: PMA92Base, PFA92Base pro-
jected forward to 2005 using the published mortality
improvement factors for these tables. See Continuous
Mortality Investigation Bureau Report 17, Part 6
(www.actuaries.org.uk).
Stochastic mortality improvement factors. Improvement
factors are assumed to be Normally distributed with the
following expectations and standard deviations.
Male “cohort” expected improvement factors (m):
5% p.a. in year 1 of the projection, increasing by 0.25%
p.a. for each subsequent year in the projection, up to
an upper limit of 7.5% p.a. This upper limit is assumed
to apply thereafter once it is reached.
Male improvement factor standard deviation (s): 0.5%.
Female “cohort” expected improvement factors (m):
4.25% p.a. in year 1 of the projection, increasing by
0.25% p.a. for each subsequent year in the projection,
up to an upper limit of 7.5% p.a. This upper limit is
assumed to apply thereafter once it is reached.
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Female improvement factor standard deviation (s):
0.5%.
Long term UK corporate The credit risk losses that we have assumed are as fol-
bond modelled credit risk lows:
Expected corporate bond yield scenario: An annual
probability of default equal to 0.5% and a loss given
default of 25%, giving a conditional expected credit
risk loss of 0.125% p.a.
High corporate bond yield scenario: An annual prob-
ability of default equal to 2.5% p.a. and a loss given
default of 75%, giving a conditional expected credit
risk loss of 1.8750% p.a.
High corporate bond scenarios are assumed to occur
when the corporate bond yield exceeds its unconditional
90th percentile, according to the parameterisation set
out in Table 1. In other words, high corporate bond
yield scenarios happen with probability 10%.
This gives an overall unconditional expected credit risk
loss of 0.30% p.a.
As the unconditional expected yield differential between
long term UK corporate bonds and long term UK gov-
ernment bonds, according to the parameterisation set
out in Table 1, is 0.50% p.a., we have assumed that
0.30% p.a. is due to corporate bond expected credit
risk losses, and the remaining 0.20% p.a. is due to the
inferior liquidity of the corporate bonds.
Variable initial expense 1% of the single premium.
Fixed expenses £500 (acquisition), £25 p.a. (maintenance).
Fixed expense inflation UK RPI as generated by the stochastic model.
Realistic and mathematical Realistic/gross premium.
reserving method
Realistic reserving The realistic reserve at each time point is calculated as
assumptions follows:
Annuity cashflows are projected using the values gen-
erated by the stochastic model. At each time point, the
values generated by the stochastic model, and annuity
cashflows, are projected forward deterministically using
the expected values assumed in the stochastic model.
The risk discount rate used for each time point going
forward is the long term UK corporate bond yield as
generated by the stochastic model at that time point,
less 0.30% to cover unconditional credit risk losses.
If the NPLTBF is backed by long term UK govern-
ment bonds, the risk discount rate used from each time
point forward is the long term UK government bond
yield, as generated by the stochastic model at that time
point.
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Mathematical reserving The mathematical reserve at each time point is calculated
assumptions as for realistic reserves except that the risk discount rate
used from that time point going forward is the long
term UK government bond yield, as generated by the
stochastic model at that time point.
Long term insurance capital 4% of mathematical reserves.
requirement (“LTICR”)
Resilience capital requirement If the NPLTBF is backed by either long term UK cor-
porate bonds, or long term UK government bonds, the
additional asset-liability mismatch reserve needed to
cover a 1.5% parallel shift in the yield curve, upwards
or downwards, whichever requires the larger reserve.
Pillar 1 minimum regulatory The Pillar 1 regulatory capital requirement is calcu-
capital requirement lated as:
1. The long term insurance capital requirement.
2. The resilience capital requirement.
3. The mathematical reserve less the realistic reserve at
each time point, provided this difference is positive,
or zero otherwise. This difference represents the
margin for prudence implicit in the mathematical
reserves.
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